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Abst rac t - - In  1993, Chang and Buehrer proposed a cryptographic key assignment scheme based 
on a one-way trapdoor function to solve the access control problem in a hierarcy. One attack is given 
in this remark to show that their scheme is not secure nough. 
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In 1993, Chang and Buehrer [1] proposed a cryptographic key assignment scheme based on a 
one-way trapdoor function to solve the access control problem in a hierarchy. This remark shows 
that their scheme is not secure enough by presenting an attack on it. 
We now briefly review the Chang-Buehrer access control scheme. Suppose that there are n 
classes in the hierarchical organization. A trusted authority (CA) is responsible for generating 
a secret key Ki and a public parameter ti for Ui, where 1 < i < n. CA first chooses two large 
secret primes p and q. Let m = pq. CA also chooses a secret key K0 and a one-way trapdoor 
function f (x)  = x e mod m, where e • (1, m - 1). 
CA assigns Ki and ti to Ui by the following three steps. 
Step 1. A parameter si for Ui is generated by the following three cases. 
Case 1. If Ui is the root of the hierarchy, then CA randomly chooses an integer s~. 
Case 2. If Ui has only one immediate predecessor Uj, then CA chooses a random prime l~ 
and calculates i = sj l i ,  where sj is the parameter of Uj. 
Case 3. If Ui has d immediate predecessors denoted as U~I, Ui2,.. . ,  Uid with d >1, then 
CA computes i = LCM (s~l, s i2, . . . ,  s~4), where "LCM" means the least com- 
mon multiple. 
Step 2. The public parameter t~ of Ui is determined as ti = f(si)  = s~ mod m. 
Step 3. CA assigns a secret key Ki = K~ ~ mod m to U~. 
Then, Ui can derive his successor Uj's secret key Kj = K~ ~(t~l)" modm. 
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ATTACK. Since the key Ki of Ui is determined by Ki = K~ ~ mod m, where the public parameter ti 
is computed by ti = f (s i )  = s~ rood m, it is possible that ti of Ui and tj of Uj are relatively prime 
with nonnegligible probability. In this case, Ui and Uj can collude to find two numbers c and d 
such that c ti + d tj = GCD (ti, t j) = I by the Euclidean algorithm [2,3]. Thus, the system secret 
key K0 can be revealed by computing K~ K d = K~ ct') K(o dtj) = Ko t'+dt~ = K~ = Ko modm. 
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